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Abstract
Decision makers facing abatement targets need to decide which abatement mea-
sures to implement, and in which order. Measure-explicit marginal abatement
cost curves depict the cost and abating potential of available mitigation options.
Using a simple intertemporal optimization model, we demonstrate why this in-
formation is not sufficient to design emission reduction strategies. Because the
measures required to achieve ambitious emission reductions cannot be imple-
mented overnight, the optimal strategy to reach a short-term target depends
on longer-term targets. For instance, the best strategy to achieve European’s
-20% by 2020 target may be to implement some expensive, high-potential, and
long-to-implement options required to meet the -75% by 2050 target. Using just
the cheapest abatement options to reach the 2020 target can create a carbon-
intensive lock-in and make the 2050 target too expensive to reach. Designing
mitigation policies requires information on the speed at which various measures
to curb greenhouse gas emissions can be implemented, in addition to the in-
formation on the costs and potential of such measures provided by marginal
abatement cost curves.
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Figure 1: A measure-explicit MACC exhibits N abatement options ranked from
the least to the most expensive. Each option i is characterized by their abatement
potential Ai and their marginal abatement cost ci. This curves stands for a given date
T. We explain why the optimal mitigation strategy to reach a target X at T is not
necessarily to implement exclusively the measures 1 to 4 cheaper than Y (where Y is
the marginal abatement cost corresponding to X on the curve).
1. Introduction
To design the best policies to cope with climate change, decision-makers need
information about the options for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Such information has been provided in many ways, including through measure-
explicit marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs). We call measure-explicit
MACCs the curves that represent information on abatement costs and poten-
tials for a set of mitigation measures. Measures include changing technologies,
notably in the transport, housing and power sectors, but also non-technological
options such as waste recycling and management of land use and forest. These
MACCs are usually constructed for a specific country or region, and for a spe-
cific date. They report abatement potentials as a function of the abatement
cost, ranking mitigation options from the least to the most expensive (Fig. 1).
Decision makers who face an emission-reduction target need to decide which
abatement options to implement, and following which schedule. They can mis-
interpret measure-explicit MAC curves as abatement supply curves. According
to this interpretation, the optimal behavior to meet an abatement target (e.g,
bringing back GHG emissions at their 1990 level by 2020) is to build a MAC
curve for this date, and implement only the cheapest options that allow the
target to be met (e.g., DECC, 2011, Fig 17, p. 52).
In this paper, we explain why decision makers need to distinguish available
abatement measures using their costs, abating potential, and the time it takes
to implement them. Indeed, the high-abating potential options required to
meet ambitious emission-reduction targets cannot be implemented overnight.
Therefore, the optimal set of measures to reach a short-term target depends on
the measures required to meet longer-term targets and on the speed at which
these measures can take effect.
We thus propose a new way for reporting information on emission-reduction
options to the general public and decision-makers. Reports could display assess-
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ments of the cost of each option, the abating potential or carbon intensity of
each option, and the speed at which each option can be implemented – taking
into account the required accumulation of human and physical capital. While
some MACCs factor in all this information, none provides data on these three
dimensions separately.
We first contribute a classification of existing MAC curves (Section 2). Then,
we build a simple model that can compute the optimal timing of GHG emissions
reductions (choice across time) along with the optimal dispatch of the reduc-
tion burden (choice across abatement measures) from this three dimensions
(Section 3). We use it in Section 4 with an objective in terms of cumulative
emissions over a long period, a so-called carbon budget, reportedly a good proxy
for climate change. We show that it make sense to implement the more expen-
sive options before exhausting the whole potential of the cheapest options. We
turn in Section 5 to objectives expressed in terms of aggregate abatement at one
point in time, closer to the actual practices. In that case, it can be preferable
to start implementing the most expensive options before cheap ones, if their
potential is large and their inertia is great (Section 5.1). Finally, we explain in
Section 5.2 how the optimal short-term strategy depends on the long-term emis-
sion objective. This means that MACCs should not be used as supply curves
when choosing the optimal strategy to reach short-term emission targets.
2. Overview of existing marginal abatement cost curves
The term “MAC curve” refers in the literature to various curves, constructed
in various ways. Here, we distinguish continuous MAC curves and measure-
explicit MAC curves. We then distinguish full-potential measure-explicit MACCs
and achievable-potential measure-explicit MACCs.
2.1. Continuous vs. measure-explicit MAC curves
Continuous MAC curves depict the aggregate shadow cost of an emission
target against the stringency of this target. They do not depict particular
mitigation measures. The existing literature builds this type of MACCs from
Integrated Assessment Models (IAM). It has for instance emphasized that the
cost of reducing GHG emissions inside an economy depends on external factors
such as energy prices or climate policies decided abroad (Klepper and Peterson,
2006; Kuik et al., 2009; Morris et al., 2011).
In this paper we take the perspective of a decision maker who faces an exoge-
nous abatement target and needs to decide which emission-reduction options to
implement, and in which order. Continuous MACCs are out of the scope of this
paper. We focus on measure-explicit MAC curves that represent information
on abatement costs and potentials for a set of mitigation measures (Fig. 1).
Measure-explicit MACCs have recently reached a wide public, when McK-
insey and Company published an assessment of the cost and potentials in the
United States (Enkvist et al., 2007) and at the global scale (McKinsey, 2009).
These curves are increasingly used to inform policymakers: McKinsey currently
lists 15 MAC curves in its website, the World Bank has assessed reduction po-
tentials in many countries in the form of MACCs (ESMAP, 2012), and Sweeney
and Weyant (2008) have proposed such a MACC for California. Other exam-
ples include the MACCs developed by the Wuppertal Institute (2006), and by
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Bloomberg (2010). Their usage goes beyond climate mitigation: for instance,
similar depictions have been used to describe available options to reduce energy
consumption (e.g., Jackson, 1991), waste production (Beaumont and Tinch,
2004) and water consumption (McKinsey, 2009).
Recent research has identified – and proposed solutions for – methodological
issues when building measure-explicit MAC curves (Kesicki and Ekins, 2012);
this has allowed to enhance the reporting of abatement costs and potentials.
A first issue relates to uncertainty when assessing future costs – it can be ad-
dressed by presenting ranges of costs and potentials instead of best-guest esti-
mates (IPCC, 2007, SPM6 p.11). A second issue is that MACCs do not depict
the interaction between different measures (e.g, promoting electric vehicles and
green electricity together would allow to save more GHG than the sum of the two
isolated abatement measures), even if they are built taking these interactions
into account (Kesicki, 2012b). Kesicki and Ekins (2012) identify other short-
comings, like the fact that MACCs frequently assess project or technological
costs only, excluding institutional barriers, transaction costs and non-monetary
costs. In contrast, we focus in this paper on how to use MAC curves, that is on
how they can help to design optimal emission-reduction strategies.
2.2. Full potential vs. achievable potential measure-explicit MAC curves
While similar in appearance, two types of measure-explicit MAC curves
should be distinguished, depending on their implicit definition of the abating
potential of a measure.
The full-potential approach gives information on how much GHG could be
saved if the measure was used at his technical maximum. It is calculated against
a reference or baseline technology, taking into account the carbon intensity and
imperfect substitutability of different technologies. For instance, this approach
takes into account that an Electric Vehicle (EV) does not emit any GHG (e.g.
saves 140 gCO2/km compared to the average new vehicle sold in Europe in 2010)
but that all passenger vehicles cannot be replaced by EVs due to limited driving
range. This approach does not take into account any dynamic aspect.
Among others, Rubin et al. (1992) used this approach. For instance, they
assess the potential of nuclear power (in the US) as the quantity of GHG that
would be saved if nuclear replaced all the fossil fuel capacity that was used for
base load and intermediate load operation in 1989, and find 1 500 MtCO2/yr
(Rubin et al., 1992, Table 3, footnote j). More recently, Wa¨chter (2013) built a
MAC curve for Austria based on the same approach, using 2008 data.
We call the other approach the achievable-potential approach. It seems
to have been popularized by McKinsey. Achievable-potential measure-explicit
MAC curves have a prospective dimension, as they are built for a date in the
future. This approach takes into account that large-scale diffusion of new tech-
nologies can take up to decades (Gru¨bler et al., 1999). In this context, the
abating potential of a technology assesses the abatement that could be achieved
with such a technology if it was implemented at a given speed (McKinsey, 2009,
Exhibit 1). For instance, this approach takes into account that even ambitious
fiscal incentives in favor of electric vehicles would induce a limited increase of
EV sales, resulting in a limited share of EVs by 2020 or 2030. The achievable-
potential by a given date mixes the information on the full potential and the
slow diffusion process, and is therefore lower than the full potential described
above.
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A MACC built this way is the one by Sweeney and Weyant (2008): they
find for instance that solar photovoltaic power can only save 0.8 MtCO2/yr
in California by 2020. They also distinguish the abating potential of industrial
combined heat and power achievable thanks to price incentives and the potential
that can be reached after an “aggressive growth” (Table 11 page 50). As IAMs
account for slow technological diffusion (Wilson et al., 2013), they can be used
to produce achievable-potential measure-explicit MACCs. One example is the
MACC built by Kesicki (2012a) for the UK transport sector by 2030.
In the following we show the value of combining the two approaches, i.e. how
the full-potential and the implementation speed, reported separately, can be
used to decide which options to implement, and in which order, to comply with
exogenous emission targets. We propose a methodology to do so, based on three
information pieces per measure – its cost, full potential, and implementation
speed – and a simple intertemporal optimization model.
3. Model
A social planner controls GHG abatement from an emission baseline, by
spending money and time on a set of options described by their cost, full abate-
ment potential, and implementation speed. We do not incorporate more realistic
but complex dynamics, such as sectoral interactions or crowding-out effects on
investment.
3.1. GHG emissions
There are N abatement options, indexed by i. The model is run on a period
that goes from 2000 to 2050 with a time step, ∆t, of 3 months. At each time step
t, emissions are computed from the baseline emissions Ereft and the abatement
ai,t achieved with each measure i at time t.
et = E
ref
t −
N∑
i=1
ai,t (1)
The cumulative emissions Mt are then computed as the sum of emissions.
Mt = et ·∆t + Mt−∆t (2)
3.2. Potentials, costs and inertia
Each measure is described by three figures. First, each measure i has
a maximum abating potential Ai, expressed in avoided annual emissions, in
MtCO2/yr. For instance, switching to more efficient thermal engines for pas-
senger vehicles may not save more than a fraction of GHG emissions associated
with private mobility. In full-potential measure-explicit MACCs, this potential
is represented by the width of the rectangles (see Fig. 1).
ai,t ≤ Ai (3)
Second, each measure i is qualified with a constant abatement cost ci — the
heights in Fig. 1. Here, we also assume that abatement costs are independent of
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cumulative abatement and time.1 Abatement ai,t achieved thanks to measure i
at time t has a cost Ii,t which reads.
Ii,t = ai,t · ci (4)
Third, a given amount of abatement requires a non-negative amount of time
for its implementation. This is modeled as a constant maximum speed vi, (in
MtCO2/yr/yr), assumed to be independent of the financial cost of the measure
2:
achievable abatement at time t directly depend on already achieved abatement
at time t−∆t.3
ai,t ≤ ai,t−∆t + vi ·∆t (5)
These growth constraints may come from any bottleneck such as (i) availability
of skilled workers, (ii) availability of productive capacities, (iii) incompressible
institutional requirements, (iv) emissions being embedded in long-lived capital,
or (v) requirement for knowledge accumulation before technologies spread.
Issues (i) and (ii) could be overcome by training workers or redirecting un-
employed workers and unused capital; but training and redirecting are mea-
sures per se and cannot be done overnight either. The issue of institutional
or organizational delays is well documented (World Bank and International Fi-
nance Corporation, 2013). Reducing them is also a measure per se, and takes
time. The fourth point is related to capital vintages and turnover: if one sees
emissions as embedded in capital (Davis et al., 2010; Guivarch and Hallegatte,
2011), decarbonization cannot be faster than capital turnover, except by wast-
ing valuable productive capital through premature replacement (Lecocq et al.,
1998; Lecuyer and Vogt-Schilb, 2013; Rozenberg et al., 2013). Concerning (v),
Mansfield (1998), and Agarwal and Bayus (2002) have found that research and
development is typically carried out from several years to few decades before
new technologies experience market uptake.
As noted in section 2.2, MAC curves built for a date in the future T fre-
quently provide an achievable potential, not a full potential. In our framework,
the achievable potential A˜i is linked to the full potential Ai and the implemen-
tation speed vi.
A˜i = min (vi · T,Ai) (6)
We can also define the implementation time as Ai/vi, the ratio of the abatement
potentials over the maximum speed.
3.3. Social planner objectives
The objective is to achieve a climate-related target while minimizing abate-
ment costs. The decision maker minimizes C, the total present cost of abate-
1 On the effect of learning-by-doing, see del Rio Gonzalez (2008) and Meunier and Finon
(2013).
2Note that abatement is expressed in MtCO2/yr.
3The initial abatement is assumed to be null (ai,0 = 0). This is done without loss of
generality: if the initial abatement is not null, a new abating potential A′i can be redefined as
the potential beyond what is already achieved A′i = Ai − ai,0.
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Cheap Deep
Marginal Abatement Cost c $/tCO2 30 60
Full potential A GtCO2/yr 1.5 3.5
Speed v MtCO2/yr
2 60 50
Table 1: Numerical assumptions
ment, discounted at rate r over the period.
C =
T∑
t=T0
N∑
i=1
Ii,t
(1 + r)t·∆t
(7)
Theoretically, a benevolent social planner can control GHG emissions in order
to equalize the marginal costs of mitigation and adaptation in a cost-benefit ap-
proach. Because of uncertainty surrounding both climate response to a change
in GHG emissions and adaptation costs, and because decisions are made at
national instead of global scale, it is common to adopt a cost-effectiveness ap-
proach (Ambrosi et al., 2003). In our model, this can be done by constraining
cumulative emissions Mt to remain below a given carbon budget Mobj .
Mt ≤Mobj (8)
Cumulative emissions can be used as proxies for climate change (Allen et al.,
2009; Matthews et al., 2009).
In practice, however, governments and other public agencies frequently pro-
vide objectives for given points in time. For instance, the EU has the objective
of cutting its emissions by 20% of 1990 levels by 2020.4 In our model, these
objectives can be implemented by defining a set of milestones indexed by m,
and by constraining emissions at each milestone.
etm ≤ Eobjm (9)
3.4. Numerical values
For illustrative purpose, we assume a MAC containing only two contrasted
measures (N = 2), labeled cheap and deep. Cheap has a lower abatement cost
than deep, but also a lower abatement potential (Table 1). Cheap could represent
for instance the measure of switching energy sources in buildings, and deep could
represent the retrofitting of these buildings. In the auto industry, cheap could
represent the energy efficiency gains in the internal combustion engines and deep
switching to other energy sources, such as electricity or hydrogen.
In the absence of reliable data, we assume that it takes 70 years to implement
the whole potential of deep, while cheap only requires 25 years. They lead to
values for v of respectively 50 MtCO2/yr
2 and 60 MtCO2/yr
2. We use r =
5%/yr as the discount rate. These values are not meant to represent accurately
concrete sectors of the economy, even though they do not differ much from
4 It is also common to adopt intensity objectives, as the efficiency standards in the auto
industry. Our model may be used with existing intensity MACCs (IEA, 2009, p. 37).
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Figure 2: Left: Optimal abatement strategy to limit cumulative emissions below
175 GtCO2 between 2000 and 2050. Inertia and discounting mean that deep has to
enter before the potential of cheap has been exhausted. Right: curves represent emis-
sions in the baseline and in the constrained simulation; in-between areas represent the
cumulative abatement and the carbon budget in the constrained simulation.
the two sectors modeled by Lecocq et al. (1998). We assume constant baseline
emissions, that is Ereft = 5 GtCO2/yr (close to contemporaneous European
GHG emissions). We use these values to carry out illustrative experiments,
which help draw more general conclusions.
We solve this simple model using a linear programing algorithm provided
by GAMS (Brook et al., 1988). The source code also uses Scilab (Scilab Con-
sortium, 2011). Code and data are available on the corresponding author’s web
page. Results may be verified using the spreadsheet model provided on the
corresponding author’s web page.
4. Optimal schedule under a cumulative carbon budget
In this section, we investigate the optimal abatement pathway when using
a carbon budget, i.e. with full flexibility on when to reduce emissions (Eq. 8).
We test a range of carbon budgets (Mobj), and assess the consequence on the
optimal reduction pathway.
4.1. Using expensive options before exhausting the potential of cheap ones
Figure 2 shows the optimal strategy for maintaining cumulative emission
below 175 GtCO2 over the 2000-2050 period. This value is used for illustrative
purpose, and will allow us to make some comparisons with subsequent simula-
tions (in Section 5).
The abatement paths (figure 2, left panel) have triangular or trapezoidal
shapes; this shows that one of the inertia (Eq. 5) or maximum potential (Eq. 3)
constraint is always binding. The cumulative abatement corresponds to the area
between baseline emissions and emissions in the constrained run (figure 2, right
panel). In this case, the intuitive ranking of abatement measures is respected:
the social planner starts by implementing cheap before deep. However, she does
not use the whole potential of cheap before starting using deep. Deep enters in
2023 while cheap does not reach its full potential before 2027. A more stringent
objective would force deep to start even earlier (see below).
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Figure 3: Entry date and ceiling date of each abatement measure as a function of
the carbon budget. Lower carbon budgets, on the left, correspond to tighter climate
objectives and require more abatement. Start of deep/cheap is the date when the
respective measure begins to be implemented; the ceiling date is the date when the
abating potential is exhausted.
The optimal implementation strategy does not follow a merit order in which
the whole potential of the cheapest solutions is used before more expensive
solutions are introduced.
A more systematic analysis using a range of carbon budgets (Fig. 3) confirms
that for any objective it is never preferable to implement the expensive deep
before cheap. It also shows that if the objective is stringent enough (about
195 GtCO2), deep has to begin before the whole potential of cheap has been
exploited — the implementation is not sequential. And if the carbon budget is
even more stringent (about 130 GtCO2), deep is forced to start in 2000, at the
same time as cheap.
4.2. Expensive options may be useful even when cheaper ones appear sufficient
Let us analyze a case in which the carbon budget is not very stringent, e.g.
210 GtCO2. This translates into cumulative abatement of 45 GtCO2 over the
period.5 Cheap has a cumulative abatement potential of more than 55 GtCO2.
6
It is then possible to achieve the abatement objective by implementing only
cheap. An intuitive strategy could be to focus on cheap and to not implement
deep. Our simulations show that this is not the optimal strategy, because there
is a trade-off between (i) implementing only the cheapest solutions, but starting
early to give them enough time to reach the objective; (ii) delaying abatement
in order to save present value (thanks to the discounting), but undertaking both
cheap and deep to be more aggressive later and reach the objective in spite of
the delayed action.
In our simulations (Fig. 3), the optimal strategy to meet a (lax) 210 GtCO2
carbon budget is to implement deep from year 2040, which makes it possible not
5 Cumulative emissions in the baseline amount to 5 Gt/yr during 51 years, that is 255 Gt.
6 Its annual abatement potential is 1.5 Gt/yr and takes 25 years to implement in full (see
Table 1); adding the cumulated potential during the take-off phase (25 yr × 1.5 Gt/yr)/2 and
the potential when annual abatement have reached their maximum value 25 yr×1.5 Gt/yr
gives a total of 56.25 Gt.
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 Figure 4: Optimal abatement pathways to achieve ambitious abatement
(3.75 GtCO2/yr) in 2050. The expensive option with large abatement potential is
implemented before the cheaper option.
to implement cheap before 2011 (for a strategy starting in 2000). The additional
cost of using deep is more than compensated by the delay on implementing
cheap. In other words, the optimal strategy uses an expensive measure even
when a cheaper measure is sufficient to reach the objective.
5. Optimal abatement pathways with annual emission targets
Commitments in terms of carbon budget are difficult to enforce: there is
an incentive for decision-makers to delay investments and efforts beyond their
mandate. Alternative policies include the definition of emission targets at one
or several points in time. In the next two sections, we assume that commitments
are made in terms of abatement levels at different points in time.
The cumulative-emissions constraint (Eq. 8) is thus excluded from the model,
and we include the emission constraint with a single milestone (m ∈ {1}, t1 =
2050) and test various emission objectives (Eobj1 in Eq. 9). We find that the
shape of the optimal mitigation strategy depends on the stringency of the emis-
sion target.
5.1. Implementing expensive options before cheap ones
Figure 4 shows the optimal abatement pathway for achieving an ambitious
reduction of 75% of emissions in 2050. In this case, the optimal strategy is to
start by implementing the most expensive option before the cheapest (i.e., deep
starts before cheap).
Indeed, the emission objective translates into abatement by 3.75 GtCO2/yr
in 2050, which cannot be achieved by implementing cheap alone. The cheapest
way to achieve this objective in 2050 is to use cheap to abate as much GHG
emissions as possible, i.e. 1.5 GtCO2/yr. Because cheap cannot penetrate faster
than 60 MtCO2/yr
2, it has to enter in 2026. Then 2.25 GtCO2/yr remain to be
abated with deep by 2050. To do so, deep has to enter as soon as 2006, 20 years
before cheap.
The 75% reduction in emissions leads to cumulative emissions of 175 GtCO2,
10
Figure 5: Entry date of each measure as a function of emission objective for 2050.
For ambitious emission targets (below 2.25 GtCO2/yr), the expensive option with large
abatement potential is implemented before the cheaper option.
and is thus comparable to the simulation proposed in Section 4.1.7 Compared
to the carbon-budget simulation, this emission-targets simulation leads to start
cheap later and deep sooner. Short-term abatement are lower — in 2020, they
amount to 750 MtCO2/yr under an emission target, against 1.3 GtCO2/yr under
a carbon budget — but long-term abatement are higher.
The loss of when-flexibility eventually raises the present cost of abatement,
from 390 G$ to 630 G$ when the carbon budget is replaced by an emission
target.8 Compared to emission objectives, carbon budgets are more flexible
and allow the social planner to reach the same climate target at lower cost.
A more systematic analysis is presented in Fig. 5. It gives the optimal entry
dates of both measures (cheap and deep), as a function of the 2050 emission
target. It shows that below a threshold emission target, the optimal strategy
starts to implement the expensive, inert and high-abating potential measure
before the cheap one. In our example, this happens when the emission target is
lower than 2.25 GtCO2/yr — i.e. when the abatement objective is higher than
2.75 GtCO2/yr.
The optimal strategy to achieve an emission target is not to set a growing
carbon price and to implement sequentially the abatement options that show
an abatement cost below this carbon price.9 However, if the government cannot
credibly commit to long-term carbon prices (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Dixit
and Lambertini, 2003), investors may be left with only current prices to take
their decisions. In this case, a carbon price of 60 $/tCO2 would be necessary
in 2006 to trigger the entry of deep (Fig. 4). This high carbon price would also
trigger the implementation of cheap (because its abatement cost, 30 $/tCO2, is
lower than the signal) in 2006, i.e. too soon, leading to a suboptimal abatement
7 Since cumulative emissions are good proxies for climate change, both simulations would
lead to comparable climate change impacts.
8 In other words, 390 G$ is the lowest possible cost to reach the carbon budget constraint,
while 630G$ is the lowest cost for reaching the same carbon budget through one aggregate
emission target in 2050.
9 This corroborates previous findings that in presence of inertia, efforts to reduce emissions
should not be equal to the carbon price at each point in time (Vogt-Schilb et al., 2013;
Rozenberg et al., 2013).
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Cheap Deep
Time Horizon t1 yr 20
Achievable potential A˜ GtCO2/yr 1.2 1.0
Time Horizon t2 yr 50
Achievable potential A˜ GtCO2/yr 1.5 2.5
Figure 6: MACCs derived from our numerical values, using the achievable-potential
approach. We explain why the 2020 target should not be reached by implementing
only cheap.
pathway. In the conclusion we discuss possible solutions to this problem.
5.2. The influence of long-term objectives on short-term strategies
Actual policies include shorter-term emission objectives, such as the 2020
target in the EU. They are milestones toward a more ambitious climate target
in the long run, as the -75% by 2050 objective in Europe. In this section, we find
that it is dangerous to use only information on costs and achievable potential to
decide which measures to implement in order to achieve an intermediate target
(Fig 6), because it can make the long term target impossible to reach.
We compare two simulations. The first simulation, labeled SO (Short-term
Only), has a short-term constraint but no long-term constraint.
Eobj1 = E(2020) = 4.25 GtCO2/yr (10)
This target corresponds to 750 MtCO2/yr abated in 2020, that is exactly the
abatement achieved in 2020 in the optimal pathway to a -75% in 2050 target
according to our model (Fig. 4).
The second simulation, S&L (Short-term and Long-term objectives), has
the same short-term constraint for 2020, but takes into account the longer-term
target: a reduction by 75% of GHG emissions in 2050. In this simulation, there
are thus two emission milestones (see Eq. 9).
Eobj1 = E(2020) = 4.25 GtCO2/yr (11)
Eobj2 = E(2050) = 1.25 GtCO2/yr (12)
Our objective is to assess the difference over the short-term between a strat-
egy aiming at a short-term target and a strategy aiming at both short-term
12
 (a) Short-term Only
 
(b) Short-term and Long-term objs
Figure 7: Comparison of optimal abatement strategies to reach the same target for
2020, disregarding or taking into account the longer-term 2050 objective (respectively
SO and S&L). The best strategy to reach the 2020 target depends on whether this
target is the ultimate objective (SO) or only a milestone towards a longer-term target
(SL).
and long-term targets. We find that long-term objectives impact strongly the
short-term strategy.
Figure 7 compares the optimal abatement strategies from 2000 to 2020 in
the two cases. With both the 2020 and the 2050 objectives (simulation S&L,
panel a), the social planner starts by implementing deep in 2006, and does
not implement cheap before 2020 (as in Section 5.1). In contrast, when the
2050 milestone is disregarded (simulation SO, panel b), the social planner starts
abating later (in 2010 vs 2006) and uses cheaper and lower-potential options,
namely cheap and deep instead of deep only. The discounted expenditures in
abatement measures amounts to 28 G$ against 112 G$ when the 2050 objective
is taken into account: the optimal short-term financial effort is much higher if
the long-term target is taken into account, even though the abatement in MtCO2
is the same.
If the 2050 target was not taken into account before 2020, it may then appear
extremely costly or even impossible to achieve. In this illustrative example, the
75% reduction in emissions becomes indeed impossible to achieve in 2050.10
Despite short-term aggregate emissions being reduced to the same level in SO
and in S&L by 2020, the SO strategy produces a lock-in in a carbon intensive
pathway that cannot be reversed in the second period. In other words, the
optimal strategy to reach the 2020 target is different (it uses more expensive
options) if it’s a milestone to a 2050 target than if it is the ultimate target. With
an ambitious long-term objective, the short-term target needs to be achieved
implementing the options with the largest potentials and the greatest inertia,
not with the cheapest solutions.
In the previous subsection, we concluded that a unique price instrument may
10 Cheap has entered in 2006. It would reach its full potential (1.5 Gt/yr) in 2030. If
deep enters in 2021, it would also reach abatement of 1.5 Gt/yr in 2050, 30 years after (30 yr
× 50 MtCO2/yr). The total would be abatement of 3 Gt/yr in 2050, when the target is
3.75 Gt/yr.
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not be the best approach to trigger the right investments in emission-reduction
measures, provided that actors may not rely on long-term signals. The same
warning applies to aggregate emission targets.
Short-term targets are a priori relevant, because there is visibility over the
short term on technology availability, macroeconomics trends and institutional
frameworks. For instance, they can be enforced with tradable emissions permits,
such as the EU ETS system. However, if decision makers omit the longer-term
target when deciding which measures can be implemented to reach the short-
term target, they will focus on the cheapest available options (Fig. 6a and 7a).
It is therefore a good practice to announce long-term objectives along with
short-term binding policies. An example are the existing carbon-intensity or
fuel-efficiency standards for new passenger vehicles (ICCT, 2012): governments
have enacted short-term standards (e.g. 130 g/km in 2015 in Europe), and also
enacted or proposed longer-term ones (95 g/km in 2020 in Europe).
This result also sheds a new light on sector-specific mitigation targets, such
as energy-efficiency standards in the automobile sector or the 20% renewable
power in the European Union. This kind of sectoral short-term targets in favor of
expensive but high-potential technologies may be a way to ensure that aggregate
targets (the 20% reductions of greenhouse gas emissions) are not reached using
only the cheapest options (as coal-to-gas switch).
6. Conclusion
This paper investigates the design of optimal abatement strategies using
information on the cost, the abating potential and the implementation speed of
a set of available measures.
Optimal abatement strategies may (i) implement expensive options before
the whole potential of cheaper measures has been exploited; (ii) use expensive
options even when cheap ones appear sufficient to meet the climate target; or
(iii) start to implement some expensive options before cheaper ones. If the
climate objective is stringent and inertia is large, the optimal strategy would be
to start implementing at the same time a set of measures covering a wide range
of abatement costs.
Our results have policy and methodological implications. In the European
Union, there was a debate on whether aggregate GHG emissions should be
abated by 20% or 30% in the short-term (i.e. 2020). This question on when to
abate GHG emissions should not be separated from the question on how these
abatement have to be done (i.e., in which sector and with which measures).
Economic actors might otherwise focus on cheap and fast-to-implement solutions
to reach the short-term target, neglecting high-potential but high-inertia options
required to meet an ambitious objective in 2050 (see also Rose et al., 1999;
Sande´n and Azar, 2005; Narain and Veld, 2008; del Rio Gonzalez, 2008).
The optimal approach to achieve an emission target is not to set a growing
carbon price and to implement sequentially the abatement options that show
an abatement cost below this carbon price. Decision makers need assessments
of the speed at which various measures to curb greenhouse gas emissions can be
implemented, and they should be informed of long-term objectives in advance.
Further research could investigate how policies targeted at high-potential but
long-to-implement options, such as urban planing or deployment of low-carbon
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technologies, may complement a carbon price in the absence of perfect foresight
or long-term policy credibility.
There is of course a balance to maintain (Azar and Sande´n, 2011): sec-
toral policies should be targeted enough to distinguish differences in inertia,
but broad enough to let economic agents select the best options and technolo-
gies to reach them (this may be the case, for instance, of existing fuel economy
standards in the auto industry). Because of information asymmetry and the risk
of rent-seeking behavior, micro-managing mitigation by defining over-targeted
objectives can be counter-productive (Laffont, 1999). Also, objectives need to
be updated when new information is available (Rodrik, 2008); for instance if one
measure turns out to be more expensive, or turns out to save less GHG, than
expected. Finally, if sectoral policies overlap, they may come with additional
costs (Braathen, 2007; Bo¨hringer and Rosendahl, 2010) or benefits (Fischer and
Preonas, 2010; Lecuyer and Quirion, 2013) that should be analyzed carefully
and taken into account (Hallegatte et al., 2013).
Our results are based on illustrative examples. The main conclusion is
methodological: we reinforce the need to account for sector-specific inertia when
designing climate policies. To date, the literature has focused on cross-sector
differences on knowledge spillovers (e.g. Manne and Richels, 2004; Rosendahl,
2004). While some numerical studies (Lecocq et al., 1998; Schwoon and Tol,
2006; Jaccard and Rivers, 2007) and integrated assessment models (Wilson et al.,
2013) factor this type of differentiated inertias, the optimal timing and cost of
emission reduction taking into account differentiated inertias is the object of
only few theoretical contributions (e.g, Vogt-Schilb et al., 2012; Lecuyer and
Vogt-Schilb, 2013).
Measure-explicit marginal abatement cost curves have proved extremely ef-
fective in communicating some results from the economics of climate mitigation
to decision makers and the general public. For instance, by reporting the cost
and potential of a list of mitigation measures, MACCs illustrate in a simple way
why energy-efficiency is a key option: it can save significant amounts of GHG
at a low or negative cost. Existing MAC curves, however, do not explain why
more expensive options, such as carbon capture and storage or renewable power,
should receive significant attention today. Our answer is that these options can
abate large amounts of GHG in the future, and that they need time to be im-
plemented (Gru¨bler et al., 1999). The reporting currently carried out by MAC
curves could be enhanced by supplying assessments of the cost, potential, and
implementation speed of each option.
With this information, the optimal implementation schedule of the various
existing abating options could be assessed in a simple, transparent and accessi-
ble process, for instance using linear models like the one proposed in this paper.
Such a model certainly is less sophisticated than state-of-the-art integrated as-
sessment models, but can prove nonetheless useful for researchers from other
fields, decision makers, and the general public. This process would also provide
figures to debate new or existing sectoral policies, such as the objective of 20%
of renewable energies in Europe by 2020, the fuel economy standards in the
auto industry, or proposed changes in land-use planning, building norms and
infrastructure design.
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